



Mail filtering on huge mail servers with j-chkmail

José-Marcio Martins da Cruz
Ecole des Mines de Paris

TERENA Networking Conference 2005 – Poznan, Poland

Jose-Marcio.Martins@ensmp.fr - <http://j-chkmail.ensmp.fr>



Plan

- Huge servers
- Content and behaviour filtering
- Filter real life in huge servers
- Filter scaling – j-chkmail's content and behaviour filtering
- Cooperation between behaviour and content filtering
 - Scalable Adaptive Delay Greylisting
- Server protection
- Results
- Conclusions



Medium / huge mail servers...

- Many thousand users
- Handling many hundreds of thousands messages each day
- Handling many gigabytes each day
- Typically – university campus gateway



Medium / huge mail servers

- Heterogeneous population : computer scientists, physicians, sociologists, purchaser... -> *hard to define what a typical mailbox looks like !*
- Users are unknown to mail server administrator -> *filters are hard to tune !*
- It's usual to have filtering being done on gateways (a place where user mailbox information isn't available) to protect storage servers
- Security issues – ideal target for attacks
- Reliability issues (availability, downtime, ...)
- Low level hardware/OS constraints – limited resources (file descriptors, processes, disk I/O and network bandwidth, ...)



(Parenthesis : SMTP dialog)

```
martins@calloway:~> telnet paris smtp
Trying 194.214.158.200...
Connected to paris.
Escape character is '^]'.
<- 220 paris.ensmp.fr ESMTP Sendmail 8.12.8/8.12.7/JMMC
-> helo calloway.ensmp.fr
<- 250 paris.ensmp.fr Hello calloway [194.214.158.171], pleased to meet you
-> mail from:joe@ensmp.fr
<- 250 2.1.0 joe@ensmp.fr... Sender ok
-> rcpt to:martins
<- 250 2.1.5 martins... Recipient ok
-> rcpt to:tartonpion
<- 550 5.1.1 tartonpion... User unknown
```

```
-> data
<- 354 Enter mail, end with "." on a line by itself
-> From: Antoine
-> To: Sebastien
-> Subject: test telnet
->
-> C'est un test, je dis !
-> .
<- 250 2.0.0 h2QBmFBx017626 Message accepted for delivery
-> quit
<- 221 2.0.0 paris.ensmp.fr closing connection
Connection to paris closed by foreign host.
martins@calloway:~>
```

Envelope

Message body



Behaviour filters

- Checks how some “parameter” evolves with time (not completely true)
- Learns with the past -> spend memory to save CPU cycles
- Reject connections (or stop tests) before checking message body (SMTP DATA command)
- Some examples :
 - RBLs – known spam sources, open relay servers, ...
 - Spamtraps – email addresses “distributed” only to spammers...
 - Connection rate : bursts versus connections exponentially distributed over time
 - Greylisting : does SMTP client tries sending again after temporary failure DSNs ?
 - ...
- Also, some RFC 2821 conformity checks : EHLO, greet_pause, ... (not really behaviour)



Content filtering

- Filtering is done based mainly on the content of SMTP DATA command : headers and message body
- Many different techniques ranging from *pattern matching* to *natural language processing*
- Each new connection or message is a new event – no history
- Content filtering consumes much more resources than behaviour filtering



Content filtering

- Pattern Matching
 - Checks if any of defined regular expressions can be found in incoming message.
 - Hard to maintain – maintainer shall check all received *SPAMs* to find pertinent patterns.
 - Resource consuming – each expression is matched against entire message.
 - Low efficiency
- URL filtering
 - Checks if URLs found in incoming message are present on URL blacklist.
 - Easier to maintain – semi automatic (scripts + validation) extraction of URLs from a bunch of received *SPAMs*.
 - Very fast – only URLs found in message are checked against a large blacklist database.
 - Very efficient : results from SURBL database are better than 80 % for detection rate and less than 0.5% for false positive rate.
 - Independent of SPAM/HAM corpus – Listed URLs never appears in HAM (surbl strategy).



Content filtering

- Bayesian filters – *Bogofilter*, ...
 - Probability of being a SPAM – combines the probability of each word being a SPAM word
- Heuristic filters – *SpamAssassin*, ...
 - Many very diversified tests – message score is the sum of scores for succeeded tests
 - Tests with positive and negative weights – score evaluation isn't monotonic
- Bayesian and heuristic filters are based on statistical data from user mailbox : they learn how **your** mailbox looks like. Classification is optimal if incoming traffic matches **your** mailbox.



Life at huge servers – top hits

# 1	127535	URIBL_WS_SURBL
# 2	127101	URIBL_SBL
# 3	125917	URIBL_JP_SURBL
# 4	120728	URIBL_OB_SURBL
# 5	96849	BAYES_99
# 6	95827	RCVD_IN_BL_SPAMCOP_NET
# 7	90406	HTML_MESSAGE
# 8	71017	URIBL_SC_SURBL
# 9	46927	MIME_HTML_ONLY
#10	36806	URIBL_AB_SURBL
#11	33822	RCVD_IN_XBL
#12	30930	MIME_BOUND_DD_DIGITS
#13	30649	MPART_ALT_DIFF
#14	28472	URIBL_AH_DNSBL
#15	26638	RCVD_IN_SORBS_DUL
#16	26621	DRUGS_ERECTILE
#17	26394	MSGID_FROM_MTA_HEADER
#18	24615	RCVD_IN_DSBL
#19	23977	MSGID_FROM_MTA_ID
#20	23690	RCVD_IN_SORBS_SPAM
#21	22457	RCVD_IN_NJABL_DUL
#22	21115	RCVD_IN_NJABL_PROXY
#23	21013	RCVD_IN_SBL
#24	20262	X_MESSAGE_INFO
#25	18044	HTML_FONT_BIG

...

	IP RBL
	URL RBL
	Bayesian filter
	Heuristic filter
	Pattern Matching

Data from prolocation.net
6 hours – 440K messages
January 2005
Thanks to Raymond Dijkxhoorn



We can see that ...

- SURBL check is the most effective criteria
- While hundreds of checks are executed, very few are enough to detect most of the incoming spam
- External criteria (URL and IP blacklists) and bayesian checks are more effective than others
- Some unreliable heuristic checks appear with high frequency (HTML_MESSAGE and MIME_HTML_ONLY)



A word about RBLs

```
-----  
mail-abuse.org : 175396  
-- 127.1.0.1 : 1180  
-- 127.1.0.2 : 168244  
-- 127.1.0.3 : 855  
-- 127.1.0.4 : 302  
-- 127.1.0.6 : 35  
-- 127.1.0.8 : 3820  
-- 127.1.0.9 : 22  
-- 127.1.0.10 : 875  
-- 127.1.0.12 : 60  
-- 127.1.0.14 : 3
```

- Using mail-abuse is equivalent to the policy : “I don't accept connections from ISP end users”



Filter scaling

- Resource consumption (CPU, memory, ...) shall grow slower than traffic level, or at most at the same rate.
- Remove all external dependencies (DNS, network checks) – faster and securer.
- Use only reliable criteria - avoid methods depending from typical user mailbox
- Compromise between doing well and doing fast.
- Do, whenever possible, behaviour checking – faster than content checking.
- Don't loose time – Little's Law says : *mean number of processes grows with connection rate and stay time.*
- **And the must** : the filter shall learn while it works – use memory to save CPU cycles.



j-chkmail behaviour filtering

- A set of very fast checks – connection rate, bounce rate, spamtraps, harvesting, RFCs compliance, greylisting, handling time (CPU usage), volume, ...
- Three levels of persistent history :
 - Recent : 20 minutes – activity of all SMTP clients
 - Medium : 5 hours – bad or dubious behaviours
 - Long : some days (on disk) – confirmed bad behaviour (usually from log files)
- A kind of Real Time Blacklist ! – connection is rejected if bad behaviour over some hours or too resource consuming over some minutes.
- Behaviour filtering doesn't block too much spam, but protects the server against surges (greylisting is an exception to both – will talk about later).



j-chkmail content filtering

- URL filtering
 - surbl.org database – BerkeleyDB and DNS versions. BerkeleyDB is faster when running with fast SCSI disks and enough cache memory.
- Pattern matching
 - Very few expressions (~150)
 - Complement other checks (immediate needs or really stable/reliable expressions)
- Heuristics
 - Very few criteria (31 in the last snapshot and number being reduced)
 - Prefer effective criteria (high detection and low false positive rates).
 - Only positive weight checks – monotonic score evaluation
 - False positive rate is higher than other filters : message whitening is let to final user (address book, known message sources, ...)



j-chkmail content filtering – seem by user

- The goal is qualitative : help message classification by final user
- False positives resulting from the lack of negative weight criteria are compensated by “user address book”.
- What happens to messages ?
 - Message is rejected by the server if score exceeds some threshold
 - If accepted, message score is presented at some header (X-j-chkmail-score)
 - User configures his MUA to :
 - Put messages coming from known users in normal Inbox
 - Put messages with high scores in SPAM mailbox
 - Otherwise put message in normal Inbox



Behaviour and content filtering cooperation

- Content -> Behaviour
 - Behaviour thresholds are lowered for clients sending SPAM or virus detected by content check.
 - Ex : connection rate limit for this client is divided by two if mean content score for its messages, evaluated over past 10 minutes, is too high, or if virus detected
- Behaviour -> Content
 - Some behaviour checks don't block connections but contribute to heuristic score
- **WARNING** – avoid closed loops, otherwise the filter may become unstable




Nice example : Adaptive Delay Greylisting

Under validation

- Greylisting, by itself, isn't scalable : number of database records grows with recipient rate (faster than message/connection rate)
- Security vulnerability – easy to poison database
- Basic idea – eliminate redundancy
 - DB records lifetime is reduced for clients with confirmed bad behaviour or some non priority client (null sender/bounces, DNS resolution, ...)
 - 192.87.30.2:joe@terena.nl:joe@ensmp.fr vs 205.158.62.177:joe@terena.nl:joe@ensmp.fr
 - Recent pending records are removed for clients with surges of dubious behaviours on short history (virus, spams, harvest, ...)
 - Limit the number of pending records per *IP* address
 - Greylisting database content is periodically scanned to detect very bad and very good behaviours.



Adaptive Delay Greylisting






Adaptive Delay Greylisting

- Limited simulation on data from domain jussieu.fr (~ 500 000 connections a day)
- Pending entries database – 430614 records over last 5 days
 - Age limiting : bounces (3971), DNS resolution (111619), domain-name/email matching (250535), max entries exceeded (1761)
 - Number of records removed : 367886
 - Pending triplets DB size reduced to 62728 records (~ 15 %)
- Algorithms and prototype under validation at ensmp.fr – improving reliability on black and white lists generation

Daily distribution of pending entries






j-chkmail – server protection


- Auto restart
 - Filter status is periodically checked by the supervisor – if it detects a problem, cleaning up is done and a new filter instance is started over.
- Connection rate control (per client SMTP).
- Simultaneous open connections control (per SMTP client).
- Global load measurement.
- When load is high, access is granted in a priority basis...




j-chkmail – connection rate surges



Incoming



Filtered




Volume data shows :
no impact on normal traffic



Connection rate control in action

- 10536 connections in 8 minutes
- 238 clients from network 66.216.119.0/24
- Each client made [28 – 67] connections
- Peak : 86 connections in the same second
- 15 messages rejected by content filtering
`www.rapiddealsbyemail.com`
- 8156 connections rejected by connection rate –
maximum allowed : 10 connections / 10 min
- **No HAM lost : “Poor's man QoS”**



Data from paris.ensmp.fr – April 2003





Virus filtering



- File extension based filtering (.exe, .pif, ...) - much faster than virus scanner, as check is done only on file name, not file content
- External antivirus (ClamAV, ...)





j-chkmail - Monitoring

```
martins@paris:~> j-printstats -q -l 6h | more
Version                               : Joe's j-chkmail v1.7
*** Summary
First Connection   : Sun Jun  6 17:33:11 2004
Last Connection    : Sun Jun  6 23:33:09 2004
Connections        :      9393
Gateways           :      4258
Throttle Max       :      445 / 10 min (for the server)
Throttle Max       :      100 / 10 min (for a single gateway)
Duration (sec)     :      0.005 16.931 7226.787 206.110 (min mean max std-dev)
Work (sec)         :      0.001 0.028  1.803   0.150 (min mean max std-dev)
...
```





j-chkmail behaviour on servers

– ensmfp.fr

- 2000 users, 60000 connections / day
- 1 Sun E280R, Solaris 9, 2 x Sparc III 900 Mhz

PID	%CPU	%MEM	VSZ	RSS	SZ	CLS	LWP	NLWP	PSR	S	COMMAND
28872	0.9	0.5	19072	18352	2384	TS	1	9	-	S	/usr/sbin/j-chkmail

– jussieu.fr

- 50000 users, 400000 connections / day
- 4 mail servers under FreeBSD - j-chkmail + milter-greylist + Sophos

PID	USERNAME	PRI	NICE	SIZE	RES	STATE	C	TIME	WCPU	CPU	COMMAND
1827	smmsp	96	0	29172K	26772K	select	0	40:45	3.52%	3.52%	j-chkmail

– pobox.sk

- 15000 messages / hour - 1 Sun V65Z, 2.8 GHZ, under Linux
- j-chkmail + clamd

USER	PID	PR	NI	VIRT	RES	SHR	S	%CPU	%MEM	TIME+	COMMAND
smmsp	1727	16	0	6072	1692	3172	S	0.0	0.2	0:00.10	j-chkmail
smmsp	21448	16	0	145m	36m	11m	S	0.0	3.6	0:07.82	j-chkmail



j-chkmail typical filtering results

- Typical SPAM filtering figures with j-chkmail :
 - Mean connection handling time : ~ 30 ms on a Sun E280R (2 x Sparc III 900 Mhz)
 - Behaviour filtering – blocks 15-20 % of incoming spam
 - Main interest is server protection
 - Greylisting – rejects 50-80 % of remaining spam
 - Content filtering – rejects/tag 70 – 80 % of remaining spam
 - Heuristic filtering – tags some more spam, but gives some false positives



Conclusions

- On huge servers, users satisfaction is the better filter efficiency measure
- There are more available data about spam on your mail servers than you may imagine.
- Do you want to improve your filter ? “Learn while work” - this means : do real-time analysis on filtering results.
- If you can use only three filtering criteria, the good choices are :
 - connection rate control
 - greylisting,
 - URL filtering (surbl.org)
- j-chkmail : for the author, a test bench for ideas on mail filtering



Thanks to...

- Tibor Weis : pobox.sk and tuzvo.sk
- Sebastien Vautherot : jussieu.fr
- Dennis Peterson
- Raymond Dijkxhoorn : prolocation.net / surbl.org
- Jeff Chan : surbl.org